Obtaining a trademark required merely registration of a word or stylized drawing, though the trademark had to be actively used to be legally maintained. The company name was the most valuable type of trademark, since it signified the firm offering the product, including its reputation for quality, rather than the size, color or type of the product itself, and could be employed only by the company registering it. Perhaps the most important inspiration to breeders in the appropriation of trademarks for plant protection was the Stark Brothers Nursery, in Louisiana, Missouri. In 1892, first prize at the Stark Fruit Fair --an annual competion that the firm held to obtain new varieties --went to an apple with a glossy red color that, so the story goes, proprietor Clarence Stark bit into and exclaimed, "Delicious! That will be its name." Stark tracked down the source of the apple, bought sole rights to the tree, which he surrounded with a tall metal fence, and trademarked the fruit as the "Stark Delicious" apple. 10 Yet trademarking protected only the name: It did little to defend the breeder against the fact that the same rose by any other name might be marketed to smell as sweet. In short, trademarking did not protect a breeder's rights in a particular plant or fruit as such. For that reason, the development of the plant and seed industries was accompanied by a demand for protection of the breeder's intellectual property, particularly through the patent system.
The American patent system rests on Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which empowers the Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries." Congress had been quick to use its power, laying the foundation of American patent law in a statute that it enacted in 1790 and amended in 1793. Inventors were given exclusive rights in their inventions for fourteen years, a period drawn from British practice, which was based on the estimated time required to train two sets of apprentices, one after the other, in a new technique. (The American period was extended to seventeen years, in 1861, a compromise between the original fourteen and the twenty-one years that, after 1836, was allowed in exceptional cases.) But in granting the monopoly right, society struck a bargain with the inventor, compelling her to forgo secrecy.
Indeed, the term "patent" derived from the phrase "letters patent" --"open letters" --meaning that in return for the protection of an exclusive right, the inventor had to disclose the details of his invention publicly so that other inventors, knowing its workings could try to improve upon it. 11 The 1793 amendment defined, in language written by Thomas Jefferson, what was patentable: "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof." At the turn of the century, Jefferson's phrasing remained at the core of the U.S. patent code (as it does today, except for the eighteenth-century word "art," which was replaced in the 1952 Congressional overhaul of patent law by the word "process"). 12 However plant patenting was legally discouraged in 1889, when the U.S. Commissioner of Patents upheld an examiner's rejection of an application for a patent to cover a fiber identified in 4 the needles of a pine tree. The examiner had argued that the fiber was unpatentable because it was undistinguishable from any other fiber. The commissioner transformed the reasoning into a landmark doctrine, noting that ascertaining the composition of the trees in the forest was "not a patentable invention, recognized by statute, any more than to find a new gem or jewel in the earth would entitle the discoverer to patent all gems which should be subsequently found." The
Commissioner added that it would be "unreasonable and impossible" to allow patents upon the trees of the forest and the plants of the earth. As a result, it became a fundamental tenet of patent law that, in general, no protection could be obtained for products of nature, either inanimate or living. While the processes devised to extract what was found in nature could be patented, objects discovered there could not. They were not inventions, nor could they as a class be made anyone's exclusive property. 13 In 1891, in a report to the American Association of Nurserymen, the respected plant scientist
Liberty Hyde Bailey, of Cornell University, added technical weight to the legal discouragement.
Two years earlier Bailey had told the nurserymen that an obstacle to any type of intellectual property protection for plants was that new types of plants were difficult to define or specify.
Now he pointed out that most new varieties were accidents that the nurseryman found rather than the product of systematic breeding, adding, however, that "when the time comes that men breed plants upon definite laws and produce new and valuable kinds, then plant patents may possibly become practicable." 14 The rediscovery of Mendel's laws at the turn of the century encouraged breeders to think that the era of controlled plant innovation had come to pass. Indeed, the power of Mendel's laws was invoked by one Hyland C. Kirk, a horticultural spokesman, when he appeared as the principal witness before the House Committee on Patents when it held hearings to consider the 1906 bill to establish intellectual property protection for plants. The measure, originally aimed at strengthening plant trademarks against infringement, had been revised to allow patents for horticultural plants, trees, and vines. Advancing a claim that would be repeated frequently in the debates over plant patenting, Kirk declared that the originator of a "new variety of plant, tree, or vine ... is as truly an inventor and, as such, as justly entitled to protection as the originator of a new motor, a new chemical compound, or any other valuable combination of materials requiring experiment, deliberation, and design." 15 Nevertheless, the bill died in committee. Evidently, few Americans considered breeding distinct enough from the practice of farming to warrant special protection. Farmers and horticulturalists might find innovation in the field in the form of plant sports or mutations that might be exploited. (Stark Brothers also continued to find bonanzas in the mail, notably the yellow apple that arrived at the nursery in a box one day in the spring of 1914 and that they soon marketed as the Stark Golden Delicious.) Both breeders and farmers continued to benefit from the importation of new plant varieties from abroad and from the expanding activities of public breeders in the agriculture department and state universities, colleges, and experiment stations.
Then, too, by practice and tradition, farmers assumed that they should enjoy free and unencumbered access to new seed varieties. And urban Americans probably tended, like
Europeans, to think of food as a scarce resource and to be reluctant to grant anyone a monopoly right over food products, even for a limited period.
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Although an immediate failure, the 1906 venture did lead to the formation of a lobbying group, the National Committee on Plant Patents, which was organized and kept alive by In brief hearings, perfunctory floor debate, and the reports on the bill, its Congressional promoters noted the considerable dependency of plant breeding and research on governmental money, emphasizing that the establishment of a breeder's legal right in his innovations might stimulate private investment in these activities and make it possible for the breeder to reduce his prices. They pointed to the incentives that patent protection would give plant breeders to develop varieties resistant to blight and disease and rich in food or medicinal qualities; varieties that would strengthen public health, prosperity, and national defense --and all without the expenditure of federal money. With sentimental nods to Luther Burbank, who was said to have made no money from his plants, the bill's enthusiasts promised that it would rescue plant breeders from vulnerability to piracy and the fate of an impoverished death.
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In these first few months of the 1930s Depression, the measure appealed as a farmer's and plant breeder's relief bill, Hoover-Republican style. With Republicans still in control of the Congress, the prevailing wisdom around Washington about how to respond to the worsening economic slide was: encourage private enterprise, reduce government costs and activities. There was only scattered opposition to the bill, including some biting harassment from Congressman Fiorello Laguardia, who was hazy in his understanding of heredity in plants but who understood well that the measure did nothing for direct farm relief. The Plant Patent Act passed easily on a voice vote some three months after it had first been introduced. Edison cheered in The New York
Times, "Luther Burbank would have been a rich man if he had been protected by such a patent bill.n23
In a report on the bill, the House Committee on Patents, mindful of the product-of -nature doctrine, had addressed the constitutionality of the measure, asking: Would a new variety of plant be a discovery, and could its originator be considered an inventor or a discoverer? The report's answer: Yes, on both counts. In the reasoning of the document, while a new variety of plant found in the field was a product of nature and, hence, not patentable under the meaning of the word "discoveries" in Article I, Section 8, a new variety arising from cultivation was such a discovery --and its cultivator a discoverer --since it was created by human agency. The report saw no difference between "the part played by the plant originator in the development of new plants and the part played by the chemist in the development of new compositions of matter."
Both took the materials of nature, exploited its laws, and, applying a variety of techniques, devised a new and useful product. 24 7
However, at this stage of history, chemical products and plants differed from each other in ways that affected the type of patent protection that plants could obtain. Patent law insisted that an invention be disclosed specifically enough to be identically reproducible. Chemical products, as dead matter, were highly specifiable as to composition and methods of production and reproduction. Plants, as living matter, were difficult to specify in either regard. These differences were reflected in the Plant Patent Act, which accommodated the basic tenets of patent law to what we may recognize as the problem of biological specificity in intellectual property protection. The act limited patent protection to those plants that could be reproduced asexually.
Often termed cloning, asexual reproduction could be accomplished by budding, grafting, rooting of clippings, or division of bulbs; it yielded progeny genetically identical to the parent plant or tree.
The act also explicitly excluded from patentability tuber-propagated plants --a provision that would substantially affect only Irish potatoes, which was a major cash crop, and Jerusalem artichokes, a type of sunflower that was widely used as a vegetable and a livestock feed.
Resistance to allowing monopoly control of any type over major food stocks may have figured in telling the association that "it seemed to be the wise thing to get established the principle that
Congress recognized the rights of the plant breeder and originator," predicting that once the principle was in place, it would be "much easier" to get protection for plants propagated by seed.
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However, while the act installed the principle, the intellectual property protection it provided was no better than the degree of biological specificity --which was to say the least limited --with which plants could then be identified. The act was extremely permissive in inventive definition, allowing patents on plants, even naturally occurring ones, that might be no more than minimally distinguishable from others, so long as human intervention had been required to reproduce the plant asexually. Its disclosure requirements, adapted to the category of living inventions, were also, of necessity, loose. They called for the submission of a color painting or photograph as well as a written description of the plant that was as "complete as is reasonably possible." They called for an historical preamble describing how the plant was bred or where the sports from which it was asexually reproduced had been found, and how it differed from the plants that comprised its pedigree. They asked for data concerning when the plant bloomed and which soils and climates best suited it. They expected a technical description outlining the color and shape of the bush, leaves, and flower.
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The early applications included a few objective descriptions --for example, lengths and the tones listed on Ridgway's Color Chart, a commercially manufactured set of cards, much like paint-sample cards, that breeders held against a plant to identify and match a name to its colors.
it. Fruit, which was described by external appearance, might be specified by such intrinsic characteristics as acidity and sugar levels. 31 The written descriptions advertised the commercial 9 identity of the plant because breeders had to supply a name for the new cultivar --usually it was a fancy one, like Delmass Peach or Peace Rose. Otherwise, the descriptions were generally imprecise enough to undermine the bargain that a grant of intellectual property protection would be accompanied by a degree of disclosure that would permit others in the art to improve upon the invention. The information in the descriptions was, in fact, of little use to other breeders, precisely because living plants were difficult to specify as invented or inventable matter.
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Given the relaxed nature of the disclosure requirements, critics questioned whether the Patent
Office would be able to administer the act so as to distinguish genuine from counterfeit intellectual property. Their doubts were perhaps accentuated when the first examiner assigned to plant patents proved to be not a botanist but a mechanical engineer who was also charged with 
33
Robert C. Cook, the editor of the Journal of Heredity, feared that plant patents would become the conceits of amateur gardeners rather than real protection for professional breeders. In the hope of making plant patents more like industrial patents, he proposed "type plants" as in situ deposits, much as the patent office in the 1800s had demanded patent models when written descriptions were inadequate. 34 However, the imprecise disclosure of the plant patent application limited the protection that the federal government could offer to patent holders. In practice, the Plant Patent Act only prevented unauthorized advertising by the patented name. It functioned more as a registration system than as the kind of rigorous examination and screening system characteristic for industrial inventions. Because the descriptions of patented plants were so poor, the cornerstone of most case law surrounding the act was not whether an alleged infringer's plant looked like a patented one but whether it could be proved to have been cloned from it. The definition of the inventive act was that a plant, even one found in the wild, had been asexually reproduced, in a sense reduced to practice. Many applications jointly listed the discover and the reproducer. All the breeders really got from the act was the ability to use a tradename and a legal basis for infringement suits. The weakness of the protection provided by the Plant Patent Act was perhaps revealingly expressed by the small number of patents issued under it --911 in the 20 years following its passage. 35 
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The seedmen may have been disappointed, but perhaps not too much so, since they had been developing alternative methods of intellectual property protection, notably seed certification. In the late nineteenth century, state agencies had assessed seeds for both purity and performance, some times writing scorecards based on visual appeal for crops submitted at county fairs. At the turn of the century, the agencies began to measure varietal yields through actual grow-out tests, the winners advertising their blue ribbons. However, farmers who bought the seed saved it each year and sold it to their neighbors, polluting markets with adulterated seed. Reputable seed dealers asked the stations to certify the genetic purity of their seeds by tests showing statistically that a bag of seed would grow into the plant promised with good uniformity, germinability, and without weeds. In 1919, state agencies inaugurated certification programs, publishing lists of recommended varieties and sometimes refusing to certify "new" varieties that lacked a marked improvement in performance over varieties that were already certified. 36 While many state agricultural departments successfully imposed standards of seed quality within their state borders, they had no authority to prevent the importation of low-quality seed from other states. That deficiency led to the passage of the 1939 Federal Seed Act, the primary purpose of which was to permit the imposition of standards of seed-quality on seeds sold in interstate commerce. 37 Seed certification, now national, not only defended consumers against unreliable seed; it also safeguarded quality seed products from the competition of less worthy alternatives --and thus protected the intellectual property investment that produced the quality.
The Federal Seed Act required that certified seed be sold only by variety name rather than by brand name. Now all seed in a given variety would be sold by one name, with a blue tag on the bag indicating that the federal government backed the purity of the contents. In many states, large seed firms had sold their certified seed packets under brand names and, in the interest of quality control, had performed free germinability tests. The act eliminated the incentives of these dealers to demonstrate that they met standards of certification: since there could be no product differentiation on certified seed, there was no point in demonstrating quality in seed multiplication. Prices on certified seed rapidly levelled to close to the cost of production.
However, state agencies usually studied a new variety for five years before deciding to offer certification tests for it, which gave breeders a window of opportunity for introducing and exploiting new varieties under trademark names. By the late 1950s, more seed was sold under trademarks than as certified seed. 38 Yet for commercial breeders, the most tantalizing method for protecting intellectual property in plants came from biology itself --through the exploitation of hybridization as it worked in the paradigm case of corn. Hybridized corn involved double-crossing from strains inbred to accentuate particular traits --for example, the height of the ear, stalk strength, disease resistance.
The seeds from the double-cross produced exceptionally vigorous crops, but if the seeds from the crop were planted, yields would fall substantially. Hybridization thus protected the intellectual property of breeders --the property itself resided in the germ plasm of the inbred strains, which could be kept a closely guarded secret --through biological means, forcing farmers to buy new seed each year.
In 1919, Edward M. East and and Donald F. Jones, two of the principals in the development of hybrid corn, pointed out the intellectual property advantages in the double-cross method that produced it:
It is not a method that will interest most farmers, but it is something that may easily be taken up by seedsmen; in fact, it is the first time in agricultural history that a seedsman is enabled to gain the full benefit from a desirable origination of his own or something that he has purchased. The man who originates devices to open our boxes of shoe polish or to autograph our camera negatives, is able to patent his product and gain the full reward for his inventiveness. The man who originates a new plant which may be of incalculable benefit to the whole country gets nothing --not even fame --for his pains, as the plants can be propagated by anyone. There is correspondingly less incentive for the production of improved types. The utilization of first generation hybrids enables the originator to keep the parental types and give out only the crossed seeds, which are less valuable for continued propagation.
According to the later testimony of Paul Stark, when in 1930 the Congress was considering the Plant Patent Act, seed-corn breeders thought they might get better and quicker protection from hybrid corn than from plant patents. 
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Following existing national plant variety protection laws, UPOV required member states to provide the option of intellectual property protection for at least fifteen years on plant varieties that were distinctly new, homogeneous, and stable. It allowed the states to grant patents on plants but not to give double protection --that is, a patent and varietal right in the same plant. The UPOV regulations also expressed recognition of the differences between the stuff of industrial patents and living matter --particularly that disclosure of the essential characteristics of living matter was, in the case of plants, a meaningless requirement and that such matter could be of vital importance to human survival. Instead of disclosing their plant innovations, breeders had to submit them for testing of their distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability. They also had to maintain the plant throughout the period it was protected. Furthermore, the intellectual property protection granted in the plant was not to prevent other breeders from using it without authorization to develop new varieties of their own. And the exclusivity of the protection had to yield to compulsory licensing --with due compensation --if some public interest required use of the plant.
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UPOV's provisions were highly specific, and, unlike the Paris Convention on Industrial Property, which was relatively lax in its demands on member states, UPOV required that its member states conform to them. To become effective, UPOV had to be ratified by at least three states, and the process of conformation took some time. UPOV finally entered into force in 1968, when it was ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. By 1977, the signatories would also include Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and Switzerland. Opposition also came from the American Farm Bureau Federation, which declared seed certification programs sufficient safeguards for the interests of breeders of sexually reproducing plants. 54 The Federation, which spoke primarily for consumers rather than producers of seed, was one of the most powerful agricultural lobbies in the country.
However, since the 1930s the plant and seed industry had burgeoned in power and allies as well as sales --had become a part of agribusiness --and it had more of a stake in intellectual Committee on the Judiciary, which found that it did "not alter protection currently available within the patent system." On October 2, 1970, the Senate took up S. 3070 as "an unobjected-to item" and passed it without a recorded vote. 56 In the House, Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Madison, Wisconsin, whose district included the state university and a large number of farms, objected to the notion of plant breeder's rights, insisting that the country had done just fine without it. Furthermore, as chairman of the Judiciary subcommittee that was involved with patents, he was concerned about how the adminstration of the act would be financed, which question virtually monopolized the succeeding hour of floor debate on the bill. 57 The bill, slightly amended to deal with how fees collected in administering the act would be handled, passed on a voice vote on December 8, 1970 and, on December 28, President Richard M. Nixon signed it into law. Breeders would apply for a protection certificate by submitting a written description of the plant. The PVPO was to provide a list of roughly 500 descriptors for each class of plant, requiring the applicant to disclose much more data than applicants for plant patents. Each applicant's data would then be tested for distinctiveness against similar data compiled from other applicants and existing public varieties already described in seed trade journals. Breeders were also required to deposit 2500 seeds, to be kept viable for the period of the certificate at a USDA gene bank in Fort Collins, Colorado, where the seed would be stored in refrigerated quart jars.
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While the PVPO computerized data base would test for distinctiveness, it was assumed that the seedmen themselves would assure uniformity and stability, since these characteristics were advertised as indicators of seed quality. Farmers paid a premium for seed that was "uniform" The act stipulated that breeders could disseminate seeds for testing without jeopardizing their claims to priority. Verifying the utility of a new variety took many years and required that seed be widely disseminated to various grow-out plots owned by different companies. To qualify for the testing exemption, the breeder needed to submit a PVPC application to register the variety name, and then to label all bags of seed. However, these requirements also controlled the purity of the seed at each step in the multiplying process. In that way, the PVPA offered the same sort of intellectual property protection as a trademark. Farmers selling protected seed would make themselves obvious by advertising the protected name of the variety; and UPOV states would be Academy of Sciences to note that "genetic uniformity is the basis of vulnerability to epidemics"
and to add that "most crops are impressively uniform genetically and impressively vulnerable." 69 According to the Commission's brief, the reduction in crop varieties was the consequence of plant patents (the brief casually lumped together under the term "patents" both the genuine patents established by the 1930 act and the weaker protection certificates provided by the 1970 act). In the brief's analysis, seed and grain companies bred only those plants that could be patented --a small number, it held --and then (somehow) persuaded farmers to buy and substitute them for native strains. Furthermore, a few large corporations --frequently the same drug and chemical companies that were beginning to invest in biotechnology --had been acquiring independent seed companies and their plant "patents" (protection certificates). For example, Upjohn, together with three other companies, now held 79% of such "patents" in beans.
The overall result: "thanks to the patent laws, the bulk of the world's food supply is now owned and developed by a handful of corporations which alone, without any public input, determine which strains are used and how." inventions." Chakrabarty's bugs were new compositions of matter, the product of his ingenuity, not of nature's. As such, they were patentable under existing law. 73 During the Supreme Court's consideration of the case, the People's Business Commission brief had argued that, if patents on microorganisms were allowed, patents on higher life forms would soon follow. That claim had been earlier contested, before Judge Rich's court, by parties with a substantial interest in the patenting of life, including, notably, the University of California, which co-owned the patent on recombinant DNA and expected to collect royalties on organisms produced through the use of that technique. In its amicus brief, the University contended that at issue was only the patentability of "single-cell organisms which are mindless, soulless and brainless," not that of higher life forms. Judge Rich echoed that reasoning, taking note in his opinion of the fear that allowing patents for microorganisms would make patentable "all new, useful, and unobvious species of plants, animals, and insects created by man" --and declaring the fear "far-fetched." 74 Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger took a more agnostic, though implicitly Rich-like position, on the congeries of apprehensions that surrounded genetic engineering. While acknowledging "that, at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates," he observed that genetic research with its attendant risks would likely proceed with or without patent protection for its products and that neither legislative nor judicial fiat as to patentability would "deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides." More important, the Court's task was the "narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute" --which the Court had done --and once that was accomplished, its powers were "exhausted." 75 In November 1980, the revision of the PVPA came to the floor of the House under the guidance of Congressman Eligio (Kiki) de la Garza, a Democrat from Mission, in the Rio Grande
Valley, Texas, and vice chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture. Earlier, in the hearings, de la Garza had allowed that he did wonder how the protection of pepper plants might affect his "little chili patch"; even so, he had considered it unlikely that Congress would overturn the PVPA: "The fellow that came with his seeds --a Johnny Appleseed walking across the plain.
We cannot go back to that, and without some form of protection you are back to the law of the While the dissidents lost on the major issue of intellectual property protection, they did stimulate concern in the Congress about whether the PVPA might, as Representative Shirley
Chisholm, a liberal Democrat from Brooklyn, New York, put it, "be contributing to future food disasters in an increasingly hungry world." Such hearings would have served a public interest, since the critics of the PVPA and biotechnology patents did raise troublesome issues for public policy: The loss of genetic diversity and the trend to concentration in the plant and seed industry were genuine. However, it was questionable whether they were the result of the grant of intellectual property protection to plants. Loss of diversity had followed upon the Green Revolution, which involved innovations without intellectual property protection. Plant variety certificates may have figured to some extent in the growing agribusiness concentration, but, like patents in other industries, they could also be extremely valuable to small start-up firms in attracting venture capital.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the fears of the critics and consistent with
Congressman de Ia Garza's rebuttal of them, the enlargement of intellectual property protection to include seed-propagated plants had increased rather than reduced the number of plant varieties available to the American public. For example, as many new varieties of wheat were developed in the seven years after the passage of the PVPA as in the seventeen years before it. In the decade after 1970, the number of seed companies increased, especially in wheat, cereal grains, and soybeans (before that year, six companies had been engaged in the development of soybean varieties; by 1980, the number was twenty-five). During the same period, almost 1,000 applications were submitted for plant variety protection certificates on 57 distinct crops. About ten percent of these came from agricultural experiment stations at colleges and universities; about twenty percent, from the six largest U.S. seed companies; and almost 70%, from private breeders of all sizes. were trying to engineer plants genetically so that they would, for example, have greater disease resistance or be able to fix their own nitrogen. 83 Such engineering promised to overcome the longstanding problem of biological specificity in intellectual property protection for plants. Like the Plant Patent Act, the PVPA recognized the problem in its requirements that a plant qualifying for a certificate did not have to meet the key criteria for an industrial patent --that is, be novel, nonobvious to those skilled in the art, and useful --but only had to demonstrate distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability. These were criteria of identification and quality rather than of some innovative essence, which defied specification. However, plant developments that involved molecular genetic intervention amounted to innovations whose essence could be defined with chemical specificity and whose character could be expected to be transmitted intact through the generations.
At the same time, the Supreme Court had opened a broad precedent by conceding that, so far as the patent laws were concerned, life is chemistry and that any new composition of matter made by man qualified for a patent, no matter whether it was dead or alive. In the view of patent lawyers, there was no logical space between the patentability of a microorganism and of a higher In March 1991, UPOV, meeting in Geneva, voted to abolish its prohibition against double protection, subject to ratification by the member states, and it seemed likely that the patentability of plants and animals would soon be allowed in the European Patent Convention by case decision, revision of the convention, or both.
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The pending shift has been a consequence of the hitech policymaking that takes biotechnology to be an essential part of the armamentarium of international competitiveness. It has also resulted from the fact that molecular biology has not only transformed plant innovation but also made biological specification of the innovation exact.
The historical record suggests that if any single category of developments has shaped the evolution of intellectual property protection for plants in the United States (and probably elsewhere), it is advances in biological specificity and control over reproduction. Biological science has, of course, not determined the system of intellectual property protection for plants that has come to prevail. The historical record makes indelibly clear that the current system has been produced by the melding of technical developments with economic and political forces, particularly the constant determination of private breeders to exploit their products. But in the absence of specificity and control, private breeders were content to let their public counterparts bear the principal costs of plant innovation and to exploit the public product for market purposes.
The greater the degree of specificity and control, the stronger the incentive for the private breeder to invest in innovation, because he could define it and thus seek to protect and enforce his right in it. Indeed, at each turning point in the development of intellectual property protection for plants--in 1930, 1970, and 1983 --the change in law or policy has expressed the state of specificity and control available at the time and provided a strength and scope of protection consistent with it. Now that plant innovation has become so much a matter of biochemistry and molecular genetics --so hi-tech, one might say --its structure of research and development has come increasingly to resemble that of other hi-tech industries: the federal government bears the costs of basic research, yielding the public good of knowledge useful to the entire plant industry, while private breeders exploit that knowledge to develop innovations in plants, confident that they can obtain intellectual property protection for the results.
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